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ABSTRACT

WIRELESS AUTHENTICATION USING REMOTE PASSWORDS

Andrew Harding
Department of Computer Science
Master of Science

Current authentication methods for wireless networks are difficult to maintain. They
often rely on globally shared secrets or heavyweight public-key infrastructure. Wireless Authentication using Remote Passwords (WARP) mitigates authentication woes
by providing usable mechanisms for both administrators and end-users. Administrators grant access by simply adding users’ personal messaging identifiers (e.g., email
addresses, IM handles, cell phone numbers) to an access control list. There is no
need to store passwords or other account information. Users simply prove ownership
of their authorized identifier to obtain wireless access.
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Chapter 1 — Introduction

Wireless networks provide an attractive means for network access. They allow for
convenient roaming and device deployability without the burden of network cables
and port accessibility; access to wireless networks is bounded only by the limitations
of wireless radios.
Although convenient, this allows anyone with a radio antenna to passively eavesdrop network communication, and anyone with a transmitter to inject or modify
packets. For these reasons, it is paramount that wireless networks provide secure
authentication to prevent unauthorized access to network resources and provide
confidentiality and integrity to transmitted information.
The original security mechanism standardized for 802.11 networks is Wired
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [6]. WEP has proven to be insecure and several attacks targeting its vulnerabilities have rendered it relatively worthless. Since WEP
has been broken there has been significant effort to create alternative authentication
mechanisms.
These new mechanisms are hard to configure, use, and maintain. They are
usually based on PKI, global passphrases, or username/password pairs (see Section
7). These methods are either too heavy or inflexible and lack general support for
environments with a dynamic user-base, such as corporations or universities where
delegation and guest access are frequent. Many authentication systems face these
same problems: complexity, rigidity and poor maintainability.
Wireless Authentication using Remote Passwords (WARP) mitigates wireless
authentication problems by building on Simple Authentication for the Web (SAW)
[10]. WARP provides manageable and usable wireless authentication. By proving
1
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ownership of an authorized personal messaging identifier, a user authenticates without pre-established secrets or the heavy cost and inconvenience of PKI. The burden
of wireless access control is dramatically reduced by WARP, where the only needed
information is a personal messaging identifier (e.g., email address, IM handle, cell
phone number).
The following are some motivating scenarios to promote the deployment of
WARP:
• Home User

Johnny, a security minded user, is anxious to set up a wire-

less network at home. Johnny is wary of current “home” solutions that use
global passphrases. He is a member of a linux users group and often holds
meetings in his residence. Johnny dislikes having to share his passphrase with
his guests. He also does not have the resources or time to setup and maintain
the infrastructure required for EAP-TLS [2] or MSCHAPv2 [13]. He wants
to provide secure wireless connectivity with the least amount of inconvenience
for himself and his guests.
• Conference Committee

A week long conference is being held at a uni-

versity. It is desired that all participants have wireless connectivity during
the conference. Obtaining user accounts for each participant through the IT
department is time consuming, and the task of distributing usernames and
passwords is unwieldy. Certificate-based methods are also undesirable; the
burden of obtaining a certificate is considered a waste of the attendees’ time.
Additionally, the conference staff have enough preparations without adding
the hassle of configuring the wireless network. Forgotten username/password
pairs or improperly configured certificates could spell disaster for the staff on
the first day of the conference, and they want to avoid wasting time that could
2

otherwise be used for gainful participation in the conference. In short, they
want to spend minimal time managing the wireless connectivity and reduce
the number of steps participants need to take (and potentially do wrong) in
order to authenticate.
• Corporation Environment Various employees from another company are
visiting daily. Until this point, the company has tied the wireless authentication server to the user accounts used for regular computer and network access.
Because of the tight integration, IT staff have had no extra burden managing
wireless access; creation/deletion of the user accounts for a new/terminated
employee automatically grants/revokes wireless access privileges. But now,
without access to the collaborating company’s user accounts, they have been
forced to add temporary users every time someone visits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 discusses SAW, which
represents a major building block for the design of WARP. Section 3 introduces
WARP, its design goals, and how it solves the wireless authentication problem.
Section 4 describes the development of the prototype WARP implementation. A
detailed threat analysis of the system is given in Section 5 and Section 6 discusses
deployability. Related work follows in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes with research contributions and future work.

3
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WARP provides wireless authentication by building on a website authentication
protocol called SAW. This section presents an overview of SAW. It also introduces a
chicken-and-egg problem created when trying to authenticate to a wireless network
using a protocol that depends on authenticating with a party that is only reachable
through network connectivity. SRP, another building block of WARP, is presented
in Section 3.1.
2.1

SAW
Simple Authentication for the Web (SAW) [10] leverages personal messaging

(e.g., email, text and instant messages) to eliminate user-specific passwords at web
sites. SAW significantly improves the basic technique employed by the “Forgot your
password?” link common to many web sites by off-loading user authentication to
unmodified email providers.
Figure 2.1 contains a diagram of SAW. Authentication is performed by users successfully retrieving two short-lived, single-use Authentication Tokens. These tokens
(AuthT okenuser and AuthT okenemail ) are created by using a conventional secret
splitting scheme to divide a single secret (AuthT okencomplete ). AuthT okenuser is
returned directly to the user over the secure link used to initiate the authentication
(e.g., HTTPS), while AuthT okenemail is emailed. If the user returns both tokens
then the authentication is successful. Since AuthT okenuser is returned over a secure
link, passively observing AuthT okenemail is worthless.
SAW provides many advantages over typical website authentication. For example, users log in to websites using credentials they are already familiar with. Because
the number of usernames and passwords required to remember is reduced, users and
5
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Figure 2.1: The SAW protocol. Based on the user’s email address, submitted in
(1), a server distributes two authentication tokens. AuthTokenuser (2a) is returned
directly to the user while AuthTokenpm (2b) is emailed. Both tokens must be returned (3) to successfully authenticate. Each login attempt involves its own unique,
short-lived, single-use tokens.
administrators will less frequently be burdened with resettting passwords. Access
control is also simplified to an access control list of authorized personal messaging
identifiers. Account management is also completely off-loaded to personal messaging
providers for sites that only use accounts for access control.
Token submission in WARP will be accomplished by submitting proof of token
possession as opposed to the tokens themselves.
SAW is subject to an active impersonation attack. By submitting a victim’s
email address to a site, an attacker obtains an AuthT okenuser . Consequently, by
observing the victim’s unencrypted email traffic, the attacker acquires the associated
AuthT okenemail and authenticates as the victim.
SAW’s threat analysis argues that SAW provides an acceptable level of risk
for sites that employ email-based password resets (EBPR) because they are also
susceptible to a similar attack in which an attacker requests a password reset for
the victim and then observes the resulting email message sent by the site. The
prolific adoption of EBPR indicates that these risks are manageable. Many people
6
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use secure connections for their email, removing the risk.
For more information about SAW’s assurances and how it generalizes to other
personal messaging mediums (e.g., text and instant messaging) please refer to [10].
2.2

The Chicken and the Egg
SAW cannot be applied to wireless authentication by itself. SAW requires users

to retrieve AuthT okenpm from their personal messaging provider in order to prove
ownership of their personal messaging identifier. Many personal messaging providers
(e.g., email, instant messaging) rely on Internet connectivity for message retrieval.
SAW authentication with these providers is therefore dependant on Internet connectivity.
The reliance on personal messaging delivery over the Internet introduces an
interesting chicken and egg problem. How do users prove ownership of their personal
messaging identifiers using the Internet when the reason they are authenticating in
the first place is to allow network and Internet connectivity? Four potential solutions
have been identified:
• Temporary Connectivity First, a temporary connection could be allowed;
a user would have limited time to authenticate before his connectivity was
terminated. This would give the user ample time to access whatever personal
messaging resources he needed in order to prove ownership of his personal
messaging identifier.
This solution carries increased liability and is undesirable as it allows anyone
to have temporary connectivity and access to network resources. This access
could be used to launch attacks or otherwise circumvent security measures.
• Filtered Connectivity

A second approach builds on the first.

It at-

tempts to allow clients to exchange traffic with only their personal messaging
7
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providers. This would work by allowing the client to submit their personal
messaging identifier to the access point. The access point would authorize the
identifier and allow the client to obtain IP-level connectivity to a restricted
network with limited Internet access. The client would use this restricted access to retrieve AuthT okenpm from his provider. After proving knowledge of
both authentication tokens, the client would be switched to the real network.
Although only “restricted” network access is provided, this approach could
lead to abuse in at least three different ways: 1) Provides potential launching
points for attacks into the larger network; 2) Allows services to be accessed
for non-authorized identifiers on the same provider; and 3) Allows exchange
of data not pertinent to retrieving the authentication token.
Protection against abuse is complex but not impossible. Sophisticated filters
could restrict traffic to authorized personal messaging protocols. Preventing
the use of providers for unauthorized identifiers would require parsing the
protocol in transit, a realistically complicated task, to compare the identifier
that was first submitted with the one actually being used within the protocol.
Filtering would be impossible if encrypted protocols where used.
Enforcing what data was downloaded using the personal messaging protocol
would also be difficult. Data-limiting caps could be used but would be difficult
to fine-tune because of protocol diversity; users need to exchange just enough
information to retrieve AuthT okenpm and no more.
The complexity of the safeguards needed to decrease the liability of this approach make it largely unacceptable.
• Out-of-band Message Delivery The chicken and egg problem does not ex8
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ist for providers that employ out-of-band channels to deliver messages to users.
For example, SMS-enabled1 cell phones exchange messages through the cellular providers’ network. SMS could be used to send and retrieve AuthT okenpm .
Authtokenuser would be sent to the wireless client. AuthT okenpm could then
be entered into the wireless client (either manually or using automation software). Authentication would be completed by proving knowledge of both
tokens to the wireless access point.
Unfortunately this solution does not work for users without cell phones and
could be complicated by latency in the cell phone network. Those who do
have cell phones are required to have them available whenever wireless access
is desired. Depending on the cell phone plan, a small fee generally charged to
send/receive SMS messages may also discourage use.
• Surrogate Authentication

Ideally, a solution is desired where ownership

of an authorized personal messaging identifier is proven to the wireless authentication server without regular network access. A surrogate approach uses the
authentication server as a middleman between the wireless supplicant and the
personal messaging provider. This allows the authentication server to authenticate the client without granting full network access.
Several distinguishing factors exist between the surrogate and limited connectivity approaches. An IP-level of connectivity is not required; the Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [1] can be used to tunnel the authentication
traffic. The access point has control over what protocols are used to retrieve
the authentication token from the messaging provider. The access point directly uses these protocols, limiting unauthorized data transfer.
1

SMS provides text messaging for mobile devices.

9
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The surrogate approach is not without its problems. Users are not likely to
trust the access point to log in to their personal messaging provider for them to
retrieve the authentication token. They need some guarantee that the access
point cannot steal the users’ credentials or otherwise obtain account access.
In this thesis we develop a surrogate solution that allows the access point to provide successful authentication between the user and their provider without requiring
disclosure of the user’s credentials.

10
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Wireless Authentication using Remote Passwords (WARP) solves the chicken and
egg problem. WARP employs an authentication server (AS) as a surrogate in proving
ownership of an authorized identifier without granting full network-access to the
wireless supplicant. The AS relays three rounds of messages between the wireless
supplicant and the user’s personal messaging provider, and then obtains proof of
successful authentication between the two parties. Since all traffic flows through
the AS, it is important that sensitive information is not leaked that would allow
the AS to compromise the user’s credentials or impersonate the user at the personal
messaging provider.
To prevent such a disclosure a strong password protocol is employed to provide
authentication between the supplicant and personal messaging provider. We base
WARP on the Secure Remote Password (SRP) [11] protocol, a strong password
protocol designed to provide password-based mutual authentication between a user
and a host.
WARP requires proof of the authentication to be demonstrated to a third party
(the authentication server) without disclosing any sensitive information. SRP by
itself does not meet these requirements. WARP augments SRP to create a generalized solution to allow a third-party to assert successful authentication between
two parties. The augmented protocol is called Surrogate Secure Remote Password
(sSRP). WARP uses sSRP to protect user credentials during authentication.
To provide WARP wireless authentication, administrators first obtain a list of
personal messaging identifiers for authorized users. The administrator uses the
administrative software on the wireless access point (or wireless authentication server
11
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used by the access point) to input the list of identifiers. His job is now finished.
Users authenticate by giving their personal messaging identifier and password to
their supplicant software. WARP then uses sSRP to prove successful authentication
between the user and personal messaging provider to the access point.

Design Goals In designing WARP, we identify several design goals drawn from
the motivating scenarios. These goals fall into two categories: convenience and
security.
From the user viewpoint, they should not be required to memorize yet another
password. Instead, they should be able to authenticate using the same credentials used to access their personal messaging accounts. This authentication should
be done in a secure manner, using sSRP, such that sensitive credentials are never
disclosed to the AS.
From the view of administrators, they should not be required to generateor distribute certificates for PKI because this is complex and difficult. They should likewise not be required to distribute or manage user-specific usernames and passwords
as this is tedious and burdensome. Instead, the system should only require that a
personal messaging identifier be associated with each guest. Although server-side
certificates are required on the AS to establish an EAP-TTLS tunnel between the
supplicant and AS (to prevent impersonation attacks; see Section 5), WARP should
not inhibit deployability or increase sign-up overhead by requiring certificates on
the client.
In summary, the design goals are:

Convenient
12
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Figure 3.1: SRP protocol outline.
• Users authenticate using familiar credentials
• No additional account provisioning is required
• Access controlled by a list of authorized identifiers
Secure
• User credentials are never disclosed
• Protected against passive eavesdropping
• Resilient against active attacks
3.1

Secure Remote Password
Secure Remote Password (SRP) [11] is a strong authentication protocol that per-

forms authentication using a password. A key-exchange takes place during the authentication, leaving both user and host with a shared key. SRP is a zero-knowledge
13
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proof protocol; it reveals no information to eavesdroppers during authentication
that can be used to mount an offline attack against the password. It is also resilient
against well-known passive and active attacks. The host does not store passwords
for each identifier in plaintext, but instead a unique salt and verifier. The salt is
used with the plaintext password to generate the verifier. If the host is compromised, users are protected, as the verifier is not password-equivalent and therefore
cannot be used to impersonate the user at the host.
Figure 3.1 shows the SRP protocol. Here is a description of the protocol that
takes place between the user (U) and the host (H):
1. U: sends its identifier (I) to H.
2. H: looks up the public parameters (g and N ) for I and returns them to U.
3. U: generates its session parameters (A) and sends them to H.
4. H: generates its session parameters (B) and returns them to U along with the
salt (s) for I.
5. U and H: derive the shared key (K).
6. U: sends proof (PU ) of K to H.
7. H: verifies PU (one-way authentication) and sends its own proof (PH ) to U.
8. U: verifies PH (mutual authentication).
Further communication between U and H can be encrypted using keying material
derived from the shared key K. It is important that the host not use K before
it has verified the user’s proof. Failure to do so would provide a malicious user
with information that can be used to brute force the password. There are several
14
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Figure 3.2: sSRP protocol outline (augmentations to SRP in bold).
constraints on the values used within SRP, which are detailed extensively in [11]
and [12].
The first round of SRP is used to obtain the public parameters, g and N . It is
possible to reduce SRP to a two round protocol if g and N are already known by U
and H. This is done by combining the first two rounds to send I and A to H instead
of just I.
3.2

Surrogate SRP (sSRP)
We augment SRP for use in WARP, creating the Surrogate Secure Remote Pass-

word (sSRP) protocol. SRP is designed to maintain security in the presence of a
man in the middle. It is this property that makes SRP an attractive protocol to
incorporate into WARP. sSRP intentionally inserts an additional party which acts
as a surrogate authenticator for the user by relaying messages between the user and
host. Adding additional messages based on the token authentication scheme employed by SAW also allows sSRP to demonstrate proof of successful authentication
15
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between the user and host to the surrogate party (also known as the relying party).
sSRP does so without disclosing the user’s credentials.
Figure 3.2 shows the sSRP protocol. In sSRP, an identity provider (IDP) assumes
the role of the SRP host. This protocol also introduces a relying party (RP), a
party that relies on successful authentication between the user and identity provider,
through which all messages are relayed. Like SRP, the protocol is initiated by the
user (U). Here is a description:
1. U: submits its identifier (I) to RP.
2. RP: performs the following:
(a) authorizes I and opens up a channel to IDP.
(b) forwards I to IDP.
3. IDP: looks up I, retrieves I’s public parameters (g and N ), and sends them
to U via RP.
4. U: generates its SRP session parameters (A) and sends them to IDP via RP.
5. IDP: generates its SRP session parameters (B) and sends them, with the salt
(s), to U via RP.
6. U and IDP: derive the SRP session key (K).
7. U: sends proof (PU ) of K to RP.
8. RP: generates a random value (KS) and splits it into two keyshares1 , KSIDP
and KSuser . Sends both KSIDP and PU to IDP.
1

In SAW, KS, KSIDP and KSuser are called AuthT okencomplete , AuthT okenpm , and

AuthT okenuser .
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9. IDP: verifies PU (one-way authentication).
10. IDP: encrypts2 KSIDP with K and sends that back to RP, along with its own
proof (PIDP ).
11. RP: sends the message, along with KSuser , to U.
12. U: verifies PIDP (mutual authentication).
13. U: proves knowledge of both keyshares by:
(a) decrypting KSIDP using K.
(b) creating the keyshare proof (PKS ) by hashing each message along with
KSIDP and KSuser . Specifically: PKS = H(I||g||N ||
A||s||B||PU ||PIDP ||KSIDP ||KSuser ).
(c) sending PKS to RP.
14. RP: asserts successful authentication between U and IDP by verifying PKS
(since only successful authentication would have brought KSIDP and KSuser
to U for inclusion in PKS ).
sSRP leaves both U and RP with a shared key (KSIDP and KSuser , or in other
words KS) to be used as keying material to encrypt future transmissions. This is
different than the SRP shared key K, which is of no use after sSRP has completed.
Just like SRP, the first two rounds of sSRP could be combined if the public
parameters g and N are known a priori.
In order to protect against eavesdropping and impersonation attacks, the link
between the user and relying party must provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of the relying party. This protects the transmission of KSuser as it is
2

See Section 5.1.
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sent to the user. Section 5.6 presents a motivating discussion about avoiding exploitation of sSRP as a covert channel by encrypting the link between the relying
party and identity provider. Barring concern for preventing such an attack, encrypting this link is optional since sensitive information is not transmitted across
this channel.
Upon first inspection, it may seem like KSuser provides no additional security
assurances. KSuser serves two purposes: 1) Prevents IDP from having the full
keying material (IDP never sees KSuser ); and 2) Makes KSIDP by itself worthless,
as an attacker would need both keyshares to either impersonate the user or decrypt
post-authentication transmissions.
sSRP is very helpful in proving ownership of a personal messaging identifier
without having to employ the use of the personal messaging medium itself. Ubiquitously deployed, this service would provide a mechanism useful not only to WARP,
but also to SAW and many other mechanisms that rely on proof of identifier ownership through password-based authentication.
sSRP has been described as a protocol to authenticate a user using a personal
messaging identifier such as an email address or instant messaging handle. However,
sSRP can be used with any password-based identity provider where an sSRP service
can be deployed. This means that users could authenticate to a wireless network
using identifiers such as OpenID or Unix logins.
3.3

Employing sSRP in WARP
WARP is an incarnation of sSRP for wireless authentication. In WARP, the

wireless supplicant S takes on the role of the user and the authentication server
(AS) that of the relying party.
EAP-WARP, a new EAP method, has been created to support WARP. EAP18

3.3. EMPLOYING SSRP IN WARP
WARP encapsulates the sSRP protocol as it travels between the supplicant and the
authentication server. EAP-WARP works as follows:
1. S and AS: use EAP-TTLS to authenticate AS and provide confidentiality and
integrity for the link.
2. S, AS, and IDP: perform three-round sSRP.
3. AS: sends an EAP-Success message back to S.
4. S and AS: export KSIDP and KSuser as EAP keying material to encrypt
wireless communication for the session.
Upon submission of the sSRP keyshare proof PKS , the supplicant has proven
to the authentication server its ownership of an authorized identifier residing on
the identity provider. In doing so, the supplicant has not revealed any information
to the authentication server that would compromise his password on the identity
provider.

19
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Software to support wireless authentication using WARP has been developed and
will soon be publicly available. This software includes libssrp, is general purpose
library that provides sSRP functionality. Supplicant and AS software have been
developed using libssrp to support EAP-WARP for use in WPA-Enterprise authentication. We describe an sSRP service implementation meant to be deployed
on identity providers and perform a simple performance evaluation of WARP.
4.1

libssrp
libssrp is a C library that provides the functionality needed to conduct sSRP

authentication. The library is general purpose and is meant to be used by applications that supply their own transport functionality. This allows libssrp to be used
across many different transport mediums.
The current version of libssrp relies on OpenSSL [9] for its cryptographic primitives and arbitrary precision integers. libssrp, by default, relies on an SRPcompatible password file populated with salts and verifiers generated from plaintext
passwords. An API can alternatively be used to allow flexible retrieval of salts and
verifiers. An argument to stay with the default configuration is given in Section 6.
4.2

Supplicant
In order to provide wireless supplicant functionality, the wpa supplicant [7]

open-source package has been extended to support EAP-WARP. The extension consist of two files: 1) One C source file to provide EAP-WARP support, and 2) A patch
file that modifies wpa supplicant to include the extension. The extension is less
than 400 lines of code.
This simple extension provides a layer that extracts sSRP packet data and pro21
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vides that to libssrp. sSRP packet data returned from libssrp is inserted into an
EAP packet that is returned to wpa supplicant. The extension also exports keying
material to wpa supplicant using KSIDP and KSuser .
4.3

Authentication Server
FreeRADIUS [8], an open-source RADIUS server, has also been extended with

EAP-WARP support. The extension is around 800 lines of C code and comments,
and like the extension for wpa supplicant, provides extraction and insertion of
sSRP messages to and from EAP packets, as well as exporting keying material. The
libssrp library is again used to provide the bulk of the functionality.
4.4

sSRP Service
An incarnation of the sSRP service has been written to use the libssrp library to

provide sSRP over TCP/IP. The service is written in C, can daemonize, and supports
logging to syslog. Although just a prototype, little effort would be required to turn
it into a fully deployable service. The functionality the server needs to provide
is limited, and identity providers could implement their own in a relatively short
amount of time, especially when using the libssrp library.
4.5

Performance
Secure authentication systems that are overly expensive in time, computation,

or maintainance, are unlikely to be adopted. This section analyzes the performance
of WARP and compares it to existing authentication methods.
Two areas are analyzed: 1) supplicant authentication time; and 2) stress tests
of the sSRP service. Table 4.1 contains the specifications for machines used in the
performance analysis. The RP and IDP reside on the same machine for the first
experiment but are thereafter separate. Machines on the network are connected
through a 100Mb/s ethernet switch. A Linksys WRT54G Wireless Router acts
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User:

IBM Thinkpad T60
Intel Core2 Duo processor at 2.0Ghz
2GB Physical Memory
Gentoo Linux running Linux kernel 2.6.21
wpa supplicant wireless supplicant software with WARP patchset

Relying Party:

Dell Optiplex 745 Desktop
Intel Core2 Duo processor at 2.6Ghz
4GB Physical Memory
Gentoo Linux running Linux kernel 2.6.22
FreeRADIUS authentication server software with WARP patchset

Identity Provider: Dell Optiplex 745 Desktop
Intel Core2 Duo processor at 2.6Ghz
4GB Physical Memory
Gentoo Linux running Linux kernel 2.6.22
Prototype sSRP service daemon
Table 4.1: Machine specifications for performance analysis.

as an Access Point to connect wireless supplicants to the LAN and provides both
WPA-Personal and WPA-Enterprise authentication methods.
Performance results are gathered by testing with an IDP located on the same
local area network as the RP (or in our case, the same machine) which is a typical
setup for an enterprise environment. Additional performance hits due to latency
between the RP and IDP are expected when the IDP resides off-site. Even a few
second time delay due to an off-site IDP is likely to be acceptable for authentication
in a non-roaming environment (or environments where complete re-authentication
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is not necessary when moving from one AP to another).
Time (Milliseconds)
Authentication Method
Avg.

Std. Dev.

Min Max

WARP

197

17

170

239

EAP-TLS

76

37

45

225

WPA-Personal

14

11

4

54

Table 4.2: Performance results comparing three authentication methods over 30
iterations.
Table 4.2 contains performance results from three different authentication methods: 1) WARP; 2) EAP-TLS; and 3) WPA-Personal. EAP-TLS and WPA-Personal
are popular authentication mechanisms in enterprise and home environments, respectively. wpa supplicant was instrumented to provide timing information for
the exchange of authentication messages to remove the variability in time it takes
for the supplicant to associate with the AP and prepare for authentication. Thirty
authentications were performed for each method. WPA-Personal takes the least
amount of time, as expected. EAP-TLS is on average 62ms slower than WPAPersonal because of the additional computational complexity. WARP, which starts
by establishing an EAP-TTLS tunnel between the supplicant and AP, takes on average 2.5 times longer than EAP-TLS. However, since these times are dwarfed by
the total time needed for the supplicant to complete authentication (anywhere from
0.4 seconds to 8 seconds finding and associating with the access point), these results
suggest that the WARP qualifies as a practical authentication method in a wireless
environment.
WPA-Personal is implemented in firmware within the access point and does not
require interaction with the authentication server. Although this avoids latency
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costs that accumulate through repeated communication with the AS, as is the case
in both WARP and EAP-TLS, it also means that WPA-Personal is carried out using
the limited processing power of the access point.
Concentrating on the scalability and performance of the sSRP service is valuable since an individual IDP may service authentication requests for any number
of RPs. Computation time per authentication on the prototype sSRP service was
estimated by profiling the service to measure the computation and ignore communication cost. A single authentication attempt requires approximately 0.044 seconds
of computation on the experimental hardware. To measure maximum throughput,
several machines on the same network, running special software that simulate the
user and relying party portions of the protocol, authenticated continously against
a single sSRP service. At 100% CPU utilization, the service fulfills approximately
2700 authentications per minute (about 44 authentications per second). This result
is consistent with the computation cost measurement of 0.044 seconds. A dual-core
machine should be able to handle approximately 2727 authentications per minute.
WARP lends itself well to load balancing since a secure connection is not necessary between the RP and IDP; the sSRP service could be distributed among several
machines to balance incoming requests.
The sSRP service that was evaluated is a research prototype; this means that
these numbers likely represent a conservative estimate on performance. Commercial
grade implementations should be capable of increased performance.
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This section contains a threat analysis of WARP and the underlying sSRP protocol
to enable proper risk evaluation by those deploying WARP.
SRP and SAW are the parent protocols of sSRP. SRP is already resilient to
passive eavesdropping and active modification or impersonation attacks. However,
introducing new elements into a protocol’s messages, as has been done with sSRP,
carries great risk; caution must be exercised to not create additional attack vectors
and security holes.
sSRP purposefully inserts a middle party in between the user and identity
provider in SRP. This creates two channels for attackers to target: 1) One between the user and relying party; and 2) Another between the relying party and
identity provider.
We discuss security on both channels individually and together. We then discuss
impersonation, denial-of-service, and covert channel attacks.
5.1

Channel between U and RP
The channel between the user and relying party must provide confidentiality,

integrity, and authentication of the relying party in order to protect the transmission of KSuser and the keyshare proof, PKS . A man-in-the-middle attack is still
possible over this channel, depending on how authentication of the relying party is
implemented. It is therefore necessary for sSRP to provide protection if the user
connects to an attacker instead of the intended relying party.
For example, WARP uses EAP-TTLS to provide security on this channel and
authenticate the AS. In order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, the supplicant
needs to verify the AS’s certificate before accepting the connection. A careless
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supplicant choosing not to verify the certificate would allow a man in the middle to
place himself between the supplicant and AS. The supplicant would establish a TLS
session with the attacker, who would then establish a TLS session with the AS. The
supplicant would be oblivious to such an attack. All traffic would now flow through
the attacker. The attacker can now observe both KSuser and PKS .
KSuser , by itself, is useless. Without knowledge of KSIDP , the attacker is unable
to derive KS. KSIDP is encrypted with the SRP session key K before travelling
across this channel to prevent the attacker from obtaining it. The attacker, who
does not know K, is unable to decrypt the keyshare and subsequently unable to
impersonate the user.
sSRP is built by augmenting SRP with elements of SAW. SAW asserts successful
authentication by submission of both keyshares by the browser to the website. This
allows for an active impersonation attack by a man-in-the-middle who is able to
eavesdrop the keyshares and submit them in place of the browser. sSRP instead
sends PKS , a proof of the keyshares, to the relying party.
A man-in-the-middle attack also allows an attacker to intercept PKS before it
arrives at the relying party. The proof could then be sent by the attacker to impersonate the user. This would be fruitless however, as a knowledge of KS would
be required to further communicate with the relying party. In WARP terms, this
means that the attacker would not have the correct EAP keying material to export
and would therefore be incapable of communicating further with the access point.
5.2

Channel between RP and IDP
The user relies on the relying party to connect to the correct identity provider.

Even if the relying party connects to a malicious identity provider, sSRP prevents
that provider from learning anything about the user’s password.
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The channel that is established between the relying party and identity provider
is insecure. SRP parameters are protected by the built-in protections provided by
SRP. KSIDP is sent across this channel twice in round 3 of the protocol: 1) In the
clear on its way to the IDP; and 2) Encrypted with the shared SRP session key
K as it is sent back to U. The AS has knowledge of KSIDP and could attempt
to brute-force K by encrypting KSIDP with all possible values for K. Even if the
relying party is able to obtain K, K is not helpful in discovering the password, as
discussed in [12].
KSIDP can by used by an attacker who is colluding with someone (possibly
himself) who has control of the channel in between U and RP. A discussion of this
vulnerability is given in Section 5.3.
5.3

Both Channels
One-time impersonation of the user is possible when two attackers that are sitting

in between each channel of communication collude with each other. These attackers
are: 1) the attacker in between U and RP (Mallory), and 2) the attacker in between
RP and IDP (Eve). To initiate this attack, Eve passively observes KSIDP as it is
sent from RP to IDP. Mallory likewise obtains KSuser as described in Section 5.1.
If Eve is able to communicate KSIDP to Mallory, then Mallory can construct KS
and impersonate the user. This impersonation is limited to a single authentication
because the keyshares are single-use and short-lived.
Although this one-time impersonation attack is complex and unlikely, it can
likewise be avoided. Encrypting KSIDP with the IDP’s public key before it is sent
to the IDP provides confidentiality, since only the IDP would be able to decrypt
it. An alternative approach would be to encrypt the entire channel between RP
and IDP, but this creates unnecessary overhead as the remainder of the message
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Figure 5.1: One-time impersonation resistant sSRP (augmentations shown in bold).
elements are already protected.
Figure 5.1 shows a slight modification to the interaction between the relying
party and identity provider in sSRP, which prevents the one-time impersonation
attack. This is accomplished as follows (other interactions remain unchanged):
1. RP: appends an optional message, IDPpub Request, to A as it travels to IDP.
2. IDP: fills the request by sending his public key certificate along with B and s
to U through RP. The certificate contains his public key (IDPpub ).
3. RP: verifies and strips off the certificate (U has no need for it).
4. RP: encrypts KSIDP with IDPpub before it is sent to IDP.
The encrypted KSIDP is only decryptable by the IDP and is therefore useless to
an eavesdropper.
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5.4

Impersonation By The Provider
Identity providers can impersonate any of their users. If an attacker or malicious

insider is able to take control of the sSRP service hosted by the provider, they also
gain the ability to impersonate the user to gain wireless connectivity. The attacker
may choose to replace the password verifier of an authorized identifier with his own
or alter the sSRP service to always grant successful authentication.
WARP relies on an SRP password file on the identity provider to provide verifiers,
salts, and public parameters for authorized users. Because the password verifiers
are not plaintext equivalent to the password, an attacker who steals the password
file is unable to use the verifier to impersonate the user without first determining
the user’s password.
SAW, and therefore WARP, are built around existing trust given to identity
providers. An organization deploying WARP must make judgments regarding the
personal messaging providers they choose to trust. The organization can alternatively require use of identifiers within its own messaging systems (such as organizational email addresses) in order to satisfy the required level of trust.
5.5

Denial-Of-Service (DoS)
SRP is resilient against attackers modifying the information being exchanged

between the user and host. sSRP does nothing to compromise this resilience. At
most, an attacker could cause authentication to fail. This could be used to deny
service to an otherwise authorized user. As simpler, jamming-based denial-of-service
attacks (DoS) already exist, the potential for DoS attacks using WARP is negligible.
5.6

Covert Channels
A covert channel is a method of communication that uses another channel’s

bandwidth to transmit data without knowledge or consent. Covert channels take
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many different forms (e.g., steganography, timing between transmissions, text manipulation). WARP could be used to send data between the supplicant and IDP.
Because WARP only opens up a channel of communication between the supplicant
and the IDP of an authorized identifier, it cannot be used as a covert channel to
any arbitrary party.
Using WARP as a covert channel would not be an effective means of transferring
large amounts of data; the number and size of WARP’s messages are quite small.
Similar authentication request throttling used to limit DoS attacks could also be
employed to greatly reduce the amount of information that could be exchanged over
the covert channel.
Since the link between the AS and IDP is unencrypted, the supplicant could
communicate information to a passive eavesdropper on that link. Encrypting this
link would disallow many types of covert channels (a timing covert channel may still
work) except to those parties colluding with the IDP.
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Various issues of WARP deployability are discussed in this section. Deployability
of WARP can be discussed from three points of view: wireless users, organizations
providing wireless access, and identity providers.
6.1

Users
Users are very familiar and comfortable with password-based systems. WARP

does not remove password usage but limits the scope of its usage by leveraging
existing login credentials. WARP’s user interface is as intuitive and familiar as
current password authentication methods, thus maintaining user convenience.
6.2

Organizations
WARP provides convenient wireless authentication to organizations. Adoption is

painless because administrators are already familiar with access control lists. WARP
softens the burden of password and account management. Providing access to regular organizational staff could be automated by generating the access control list
using existing knowledge of staff identifiers. Guest access could then be maintained
by manually populating a second access control list.
WARP is unusable in organizations where the authentication server is unable
to communicate with identity providers (e.g., ad-hoc networks without Internet
connectivity).
WARP assumes the same level of trust extended to identity providers by SAW
and may be inappropriate for use in organizations where the existing trust extended
to third-party identity providers is insufficient.
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6.3

Identity Providers
WARP requires identity providers to host an sSRP service. Until incentives

outweigh the cost, it is unlikely that every identity provider will be willing to meet
this requirement. Fortunately, sSRP is simple and easy to implement and therefore
comes at a minimal cost.
As mentioned previously, sSRP relies on an SRP password file to provide verifiers,
salts, and public parameters for authorized users. These password file entries are
created during an enrollment process. It may be unfeasible for identity providers to
force a re-enrollment process for their users. Identity providers will therefore have
to migrate their existing password files.
Migration problems arise because password files generally contain non-plaintext
forms of the passwords1 (e.g., password hash); the SRP verifier is generated using
the plaintext password and the salt. In this case, the verifier may have to be
generated using the non-plaintext form. When generating verifiers this way, it is
not recommended that the existing password file be maintained side-by-side the
SRP password file. This would allow an attacker who steals the existing password
file to impersonate the user at the provider (since he could use the non-plaintext
form of the password to impersonate the user).
Identity providers who currently use services that receive a plaintext password
from the user (e.g., Unix logins) could modify the service to intercept the password
and generate an SRP password file entry. This removes the need for a formal reenrollment process; users log in once to enable sSRP. The modified service could
be deployed well in advance of sSRP deployment to generate SRP password entries
for most users. Since existing password files are not used to generate the verifiers,
1

To prevent easy discovery of the password if the password file is stolen.
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they can be safely maintained side-by-side the SRP password file; easing gradual
deployment.
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Many authentication systems rely on pre-established shared secrets. System-wide
passphrases used in mechanisms like WEP [6] and WPA-PSK [3] can be difficult to
distribute. If the shared secret is compromised a new one must be deployed to each
device. Guest access can only be achieved by disclosure of the shared secret, a step
that should make security conscious administrators cringe. It is also difficult to audit
access because each user connects using the same passphrase (MAC addresses could
be used but are not a reliable means of identity since they are trivially spoofed).
Many of these protocols leak information that can be used to mount an off-line
dictionary attack against the pre-established secret; if a weak shared secret is chosen
the wireless network could be trivially compromised.
Individual user accounts with passwords are employed by challenge/responsebased systems such as MSCHAPv2 [13]. Account-level password-based authentication provides reasonable deployability with a static group of users. It also lends
itself to auditing because authentication is tied to a set of credentials. However,
these systems suffer from the same issues of other password-based authentication
mechanisms: password re-use and difficulty in remembering strong passwords. It is
also difficult to configure guest access in organizations where account creation incurs
significant overhead or time. Delegation of wireless access is difficult and requires a
user to disclose his/her credentials to the delegate.
Recent authentication mechanisms rely on PKI to provide authentication. These
systems, when deployed correctly, are quite secure. However, managing certificates
and securing public/private key-pairs are challenging tasks for even savvy end-users.
The sign-up process can be resource intensive, adding additional overhead on IT staff
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who must verify user identity and issue certificates according to stringent company
policies. Each authenticating device must also have access to a private key tied to
a certificate, which decreases deployability.
Greenpass [5] leverages EAP-TLS [2] for authentication. EAP-TLS relies on PKI
to provide the client and server certificates used in the TLS handshake. Greenpass
also provides decentralized delegation of access by allowing delegators to sign an
SDSI-SPKI certificate belonging to the guest with their X.509 certificates. Guests
can then use the SDSI-SPKI as their EAP-TLS client-side certificate. Greenpass suffers from the inherent difficulties of PKI as enrollment of regular users still involves
a CA issuing X.509 certificates.
Network-in-a-Box (NiaB) [4] enrolls devices in the wireless network by employing
location-limited communication channels (e.g., infrared or a USB key) to securely
distribute keys necessary for PKI. Although key distribution is simplified, NiaB still
requires significant management for enterprise environments where security restrictions require IT staff to scrutinize each certificate request made during enrollment.
In an organization that supports thousands of users this overhead can be significant.
Typically only one device may be serviced at a time per enrollment station due to the
location-limited channel on which enrollment is done. This one-at-a-time approach
creates a bottleneck in circumstances where large amounts of new devices need to
be enrolled within a short time period (i.e., wireless connectivity at a conference
where most delegates arrive within a short period of time).
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Wireless Authentication using Remote Passwords is a secure and usable wireless
authentication mechanism. WARP is simple and provides administrators with an
easy way to manage wireless networks. Managing access is done by supplying administrative software with a list of personal messaging identifiers. Minimal account
provisioning is necessary. Users authenticate by proving ownership of an authorized
identifier. This is done by providing the supplicant software with a password for an
email or other personal messaging account.
WARP is secure and protects against well-known cryptographic attacks. No
information is leaked that would allow an attacker to impersonate or otherwise
compromise the user’s credentials.
sSRP is a general surrogate authentication protocol that can be used to prove
authentication between user and host to a relying party. sSRP is based on SRP and
inherits many of SRP’s cryptographic assurances. sSRP has many uses outside the
scope of WARP.
A large amount of research surrounding WARP and sSRP remains to be done.
The usability of WARP could be confirmed by conducting a user study. The
study would help to evaluate and improve both the supplicant and administrative
software. It could also provide insight into how users react to obtaining wireless
access by using their personal messaging identifier credentials.
sSRP could replace the use of email or instant messages in the original SAW
protocol to provide website authentication. Using the sSRP protocol in this manner would increase the security of SAW, as it has the potential to thwart active
impersonation attacks by third parties, and eliminate latency issues associated with
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personal message delivery. SAW can also suffer from usability problems due to latency in email delivery; having to wait more than a few seconds to log in to a website
can be uncomfortable for users. If for some reason the email never arrives, as could
be the result of an over-protective spam filter, the users are denied authentication
capability. sSRP-based SAW would not be subject to these problems and therefore
is more convenient and usable than the original SAW.
SAW enables intuitive delegation between personal messaging identifiers and
natural client-side auditing capabilities. Further research could provide both of
these useful abilities to sSRP.
sSRP need not be limited to personal messaging identifiers only. It can be
deployed in conjunction with any username/password-based system.
An interesting combination would be the use of sSRP with OpenID identifiers.
OpenID does not require any client-side changes to the browser. Consequently
the protocol has to operate in a way that opens a few security holes. Although
the benefits of no client-side changes are clear, third-party authentication can be
achieved more securely with sSRP. Further research would be needed to fully explore
and understand the potential uses of sSRP with OpenID.
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